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Cognitive theories on deception posit that lying requires more cognitive resources than
telling the truth. In line with this idea, it has been demonstrated that deceptive responses
are typically associated with increased response times and higher error rates compared to
truthful responses. Although the cognitive cost of lying has been assumed to be resistant
to practice, it has recently been shown that people who are trained to lie can reduce this
cost. In the present study (n=42), we further explored the effects of practice on one’s abil-
ity to lie by manipulating the proportions of lie and truth-trials in a Sheffield lie test across
three phases: Baseline (50% lie, 50% truth), Training (frequent-lie group: 75% lie, 25%
truth; control group: 50% lie, 50% truth; and frequent-truth group: 25% lie, 75% truth),
and Test (50% lie, 50% truth). The results showed that lying became easier while partici-
pants were trained to lie more often and that lying became more difficult while participants
were trained to tell the truth more often. Furthermore, these effects did carry over to the
test phase, but only for the specific items that were used for the training manipulation.
Hence, our study confirms that relatively little practice is enough to alter the cognitive cost
of lying, although this effect does not persist over time for non-practiced items.
Keywords: deception, cognitive training, response inhibition, lie detection, intentionality
INTRODUCTION
Cognitive theories on deception posit that deliberate and suc-
cessful lying requires more cognitive resources than telling the
truth (Vrij et al., 2006, 2011). Liars have to fabricate a story, mon-
itor the reactions of the interaction partner, make sure that their
story remains coherent and consistent, control behaviors that may
signal lying or stress, and inhibit or conceal the truth. Several neu-
roimaging studies have provided evidence in line with this idea,
showing that prefrontal brain regions which are involved in cog-
nitive control (i.e., the anterior cingulate, dorsolateral prefrontal,
and inferior frontal regions) are more active when participants are
lying compared to when they are telling the truth (for reviews, see
Christ et al., 2009; Gamer, 2011). The higher activation of brain
regions involved in cognitive control suggests that individuals who
are lying are engaged in a cognitively demanding task. Although it
is generally agreed that lying comes at a cognitive cost and telling
the truth is the default, dominant response, there is less agreement
as to whether this cognitive cost is invariable or whether it is mal-
leable through practice. For instance, pathological liars lie so often
that lying becomes an automatism rather than an exception (Dike
et al., 2005). One can thus expect that such people experience less
cognitive difficulty when lying. The same holds for crime suspects
who face interrogation and who have thoroughly practiced their
story (Spence et al., 2008) or for people who have told the same lies
so often that they believe their lies to be the truth (Polage, 2012).
To date, however, evidence concerning the effect of practice
on the cognitive cost of lying is both scarce and mixed. John-
son et al. (2005) asked participants to memorize a list of words,
and later used these and other words in an old/new recognition
task. Over different blocks of the word recognition task, partici-
pants were instructed to either respond truthfully or deceptively.
Crucially, they found that both behavioral and neurological mea-
sures of cognitive control were unaffected by practice in deceptive
responding. These findings led the authors to conclude that lying
always comes at a cognitive cost, and thus that the cognitive com-
plexity of lying is resistant to practice. It should be noted, however,
that Johnson et al. adopted a blocked within-subjects design with
a random succession of truthful and deceptive blocks. Such an
approach may have been suboptimal to study the impact of prac-
tice on the cognitive cost of lying as participants’ ability to lie
in deceptive blocks may have been counteracted by intermedi-
ate truthful blocks, and vice versa. Vendemia et al. (2005) used
autobiographical statements about their participants which were
either true or false. In three sessions, participants were required
to respond truthfully on half of the trials and deceptively on the
other half of the trials, depending on the color of the statements.
Although reaction time data revealed no practice effect whatso-
ever the errors data did show that the difference between deceptive
and truthful responses diminished following practice. This latter
finding illustrates that practice may have had some effect on the
cognitive cost of lying. Furthermore, the training manipulation in
this experiment was relatively weak, as participants were required
to respond both truthfully and deceptively 50% of the time. As
such, participants were not explicitly trained to either lie or tell the
truth. Finally, using a Sheffield lie test (Spence et al., 2001; a vari-
ant of the differentiation of deception paradigm by Furedy et al.,
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1988), Verschuere et al. (2011b) recently challenged the idea that
the cognitive cost of lying is resistant to practice. In the standard
version of this task, autobiographical questions are presented on
a computer screen, and participants provide yes/no-answers using
one of two different response keys. The questions can appear in
two different colors, and participants are instructed to lie if the
sentence is presented in the one color (lie-trials) and to tell the
truth if the sentence is presented in the other color (truth-trials).
In a control group, with 50% lie-trials and 50% truth-trials, they
found that lying requires more cognitive resources than telling the
truth, as illustrated by slower response times and more errors on
lie-trials compared to truth-trials (i.e., the lie-effect; see also Sar-
tori et al., 2008). In two other groups, a number of filler trials were
added in order to manipulate the numbers of lie and truth-trials.
In the frequent-lie group, all these filler trials required a decep-
tive response. In contrast, all the filler trials required a truthful
response in the frequent-truth group. As such, participants in the
frequent-lie group were required to lie on 75% of the trials whereas
participants in the frequent-truth group only lied on 25% of the
trials. Both the response latency data and error rates indicated that
lying became easier while people were lying more often, and lying
became more difficult while people gave more truthful responses.
In the present experiment, we further examined the influence
of practice on the cognitive cost of lying. More specifically, we
investigated (1) whether practice has an effect on participants’ ini-
tial cognitive cost of lying, and (2) whether such effects continue
to exist after the training, and thus whether practice really changes
the dominance of the truth response. The experimental design
used by Verschuere et al. (2011b) did not allow firm conclusions
concerning this important matter because they only assessed the
lie-effects while participants were being exposed to either a high
proportion of lie-trials or a high proportion of truth-trials. As
such, their results indicate only that while participants are lying
often, lying becomes easier, and while participants are often telling
the truth, lying becomes more difficult. Therefore, we attempted to
replicate and extend the findings of Verschuere et al. by prolonging
the training phase and by adding a baseline phase and a test phase
in which participants were required to respond deceptively and
truthfully equally often. We expected that (1) the cognitive cost of
lying would change as a result of our training manipulation, and
(2) if practice does genuinely change the dominance of the truth
response, the change in the cognitive cost of lying would persist
over time. In other words, we expected a linear trend in the size of
the lie-effect in the training phase as a function of the proportion
of lie-trials, with a smaller lie-effect in the frequent-lie group, a
medium lie-effect in the control group, and a larger lie-effect in
the frequent-truth group. If training genuinely alters the domi-
nance of the truth response, this linear trend should extend to the
test phase.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Forty-five undergraduate students (23 men) of Ghent University
participated in exchange for course credits. The data of three par-
ticipants were not analyzed because of poor accuracy on test trials
(see below; participants’accuracy scores= 54, 58, and 62%; deviat-
ing more than 2.5SDs from the group average= 89%, SD= 10%).
Hence, our results are based on the data of 42 participants.
All participants provided written informed consent prior to the
experiment.
MODIFIED SHEFFIELD LIE TEST
In the Sheffield lie test, we used 108 different questions. Thirty-six
of these questions were yes-or-no questions about basic seman-
tic knowledge, and were used to allow us to give performance
feedback during the acquaintance phase. Half of these practice
questions required a “no”-response (e.g., “Is London a Belgian
city?”), and the other half required a “yes” -response (e.g., “Is a
stone hard?”). The remaining 72 questions were autobiograph-
ical yes-or-no questions related to actions that participants had
or had not performed on the day of testing (see Table A1 in
Appendix). Before the start of the experiment, participants were
asked to give a truthful response to these questions. Some of these
questions were more likely to elicit an affirmative response (e.g.,
“Did you drink water?”) than others (e.g., “Did you greet a police
officer?”). In this way we tried to establish a yes-no ratio of approx-
imately 50%. Analyses of the yes/no ratio revealed that participants
gave more no-answers (67%, SD= 6.92) than yes-answers (33%),
t (41)= 15.82, p< 0.001. However, this was the case for all three
groups (see below), all t s> 9.27, all ps< 0.001, and there was no
difference between the groups, F(2, 39)= 1.65, p= 0.20. Half of
these questions were used in filler trials, and the other half in
test trials (counterbalanced). The general appearance of test trials
and filler trials was identical. On each trial, a sentence was pre-
sented in white bold Arial font in the center of the black screen,
together with the response labels “YES” and “NO” at the sides of
the screen. The response labels could either appear in blue or in
yellow, and, depending on this color, participants were required to
give a truthful or a deceptive yes-no response (i.e., blue= truth,
yellow= lie, or vice versa) by pressing either the “4” or the “6” key
on the numeric pad of a standard AZERTY keyboard. The assign-
ment of the two response buttons to either yes-or-no responses
was counterbalanced across participants, as was the assignment of
the two colors to either truthful or deceptive responding. There
was no response deadline. In order to prevent strategic recoding
of the task, we also included catch trials (Johnson et al., 2003, 2005;
Verschuere et al., 2011b). On these trials, either the word “yes” or
the word“no”appeared in the center of the screen and participants
were required to respond according to their meaning (i.e., press
the yes-button for the word “yes”, and the no-button for the word
“no”), irrespective of the color of the response labels.
Our modified version of the Sheffield lie test consisted of 924
trials, presented in an acquaintance phase (24 trials), a baseline
phase (180 trials), a training phase (540 trials), and a test phase
(180 trials). The acquaintance phase consisted of only semantic tri-
als with performance feedback allowing participants to familiarize
with the task at hand. The data of these trials were not analyzed.
In the baseline phase, we presented 72 test trials (36 truth, 36 lie),
72 filler trials (36 truth, 36 lie), and 36 catch trials (18 yes, 18 no)
in an intermixed, random fashion. In the training phase, partici-
pants were randomly assigned to one of three different groups. In
all three groups, we presented three identical blocks, each consist-
ing of 72 test trials (36 truth, 36 lie), 72 filler trials, and 36 catch
trials. For the test trials, the proportion of truthful and deceptive
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responses remained 50/50. However, the proportion of filler tri-
als requiring a deceptive or a truthful response differed across
the three groups in the training phase. In the frequent-lie group,
all the filler trials required a deceptive response, whereas in the
frequent-truth group, all the filler trials required the participants
to respond truthfully. Finally, in the control group, half of the filler
trials required a truthful response, and half required a deceptive
response. As such, due to the manipulation of the lie-truth pro-
portion of the filler trials, participants in the frequent-lie group
lied on 75% of the trials in the training phase, whereas partici-
pants in the frequent-truth group only lied on 25% of the trials.
Participants were not informed about this manipulation. The last
phase was a test phase, which was identical to the baseline phase.
Participants were allowed to take a short break after each block.
DATA PROCESSING
For the analyses of the response latency data, trials with erroneous
responses were discarded. In order to reduce the impact of extreme
reaction times, we recoded response latencies faster than 300 ms
and slower than 3000–300 and 3000 ms respectively (Greenwald
et al., 1998)1. Using this procedure, we recoded a total of 10.43% of
the correct trials (for latencies larger than 3000 ms: 5.43% lie-trials
and 4.77% truth-trials; for latencies smaller than 300 ms: 0.11%
lie-trials and 0.12% truth-trials). Next, for each participant and
each experimental condition, we calculated the average response
latencies (ms) and accuracy scores (%). Finally, we calculated “lie-
effect” scores by subtracting the response latencies and accuracy
scores on lie-trials from the response latencies and accuracy scores
on truth-trials. A large positive lie-effect score reflects greater dif-
ficulty in lying, and a negative lie-effect score reflects greater ease
in lying. For all analyses, the alpha level was set to 0.05.
RESULTS
TEST TRIALS
Test trials were analyzed in order to investigate (1) whether prac-
tice in truthful and deceptive responding on the filler trials affected
truthful and deceptive responding on the test trials during the
training phase, and (2) whether these effects transferred to the test
phase. To do so, we subjected the lie-effect scores of both the reac-
tion time data and the errors to 3 (Group: frequent-lie vs. control
vs. frequent-truth)× 3 (Experiment Phase: baseline vs. practice vs.
test) repeated measures ANOVAs with Group as a between sub-
jects factor and Experiment Phase as a within subject factor. We
expected no group differences in the baseline phase, and a linear
effect of Group (i.e., a gradual increase in the magnitude of the
lie-effect from the frequent-lie group over the control group to the
frequent-truth group) in the training phase. Finally, we expected
this training effect to generalize to the test phase.
Reaction times
Neither of the main effects reached significance, both Fs< 1.
However, the interaction between the linear effect of Group
1Another outlier analysis in which we first removed all reaction times faster than
200 ms and slower than 5000 ms and then removed all reaction times that deviated
more than 3SDs from the individual’s mean yielded the same overall pattern of
results.
and Experiment Phase followed a significant quadratic course,
F(1, 39)= 18.56, p< 0.0005 (see Figure 1A), indicating that
the linear effect of Group varied across the three Experiment
Phases. Whereas the lie-effect was the same for the three groups
during the baseline phase, F < 1 (frequent-lie group: M = 222,
SD= 217; control group: M = 148, SD= 242; frequent-truth
group: M = 163, SD= 176), there was a significant linear effect
of Group during the training phase, F(1, 39)= 7.56, p< 0.01,
ƒ= 0.442. This linear course illustrates that the size of the lie-
effect gradually increased from the frequent-lie group (M = 53,
SD= 245) over the control group (M = 145, SD= 123) to the
frequent-truth group (M = 239, SD= 146). In the test phase, there
was no effect of Group, F < 1, indicating that the lie-effect scores
of the three groups no longer differed significantly (frequent-lie
group: M = 180, SD= 238; control group: M = 171, SD= 195;
frequent-truth group: M = 127, SD= 231).
Errors
As for the reaction time data, neither of the main effects reached
significance, both Fs< 1.45, both ps> 0.24. However, the interac-
tion between Experiment Phase and the linear effect of Group
again followed a significant quadratic course, F(1, 39)= 4.73,
p< 0.05 (see Figure 1B), illustrating that group differences in
the lie-effect varied across the three Experiment Phases. The lie-
effect was the same for the three groups in the baseline phase,
F < 1 (frequent-lie group: M = 4.56, SD= 4.44; control group:
M = 4.37, SD= 7.68; frequent-truth group:M = 4.76, SD= 9.27).
However, in the training phase, there was a significant linear effect
of Group, F(1, 39)= 7.21, p< 0.05, ƒ= 0.42. As can be seen in
Figure 1B, the lie-effect in the training phase was smaller in
the frequent-lie group (M = 0.60, SD= 3.90), intermediate in the
control group (M = 2.32, SD= 3.01), and larger in the frequent-
truth group (M = 5.27, SD= 6.32). These group differences
were no longer significant in the test phase, F < 1 (frequent-lie
group:M = 4.76, SD= 5.49; control group:M = 4.17, SD= 10.77;
frequent-truth group: M = 3.39, SD= 9.26).
FILLER TRIALS
Filler trials were analyzed in order to investigate whether practice
with specific items influences the cognitive cost of lying on these
specific items. For these analyses, we discarded the data of the
training phase because these trials were all either lie-trials or truth-
trials for the two experimental groups, and hence do not allow
to calculate the crucial difference between truthful and deceptive
responses. For both reaction times and error rates, the lie-effect
scores were subjected to a 3(Group)× 2(Experiment Phase: base-
line vs. test) repeated measures ANOVA. We expected no group
differences in the baseline phase, and a linear effect of Group
(i.e., a gradual increase in the magnitude of the lie-effect from the
frequent-lie group over the control group to the frequent-truth
group) in the test phase.
2We calculated the effect size ƒ using the following formula: f = √[η2p/(1 − η2p)].
According to Cohen (1992), values from 0.10 represent small effects, values from
0.25 represent medium effects and values from 0.40 represent large effects.
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Reaction times
Analysis of the lie-effect scores on filler trials yielded a signifi-
cant main effect of Group, F(2, 39)= 4.07, p< 0.05. Follow-up
between-group comparisons showed that neither the frequent-
truth group nor the frequent-lie group differed significantly from
the control group, F(1, 26)= 0.95, p= 0.10, and F(1, 26)= 1.04,
p= 0.32, respectively. However, the lie-effect was significantly
larger in the frequent-truth group compared to the frequent-lie
group, F(1,26)= 7.64, p< 0.05. The interaction between Exper-
iment Phase and the linear effect of Group was not significant,
F(1, 39)= 2.65, p= 0.11. Exploratory analyses on each experi-
ment phase separately showed, however, that there was no linear
effect of Group in the baseline phase, F(1, 39)= 1.29, p= 0.26
(frequent-lie group: M = 111, SD= 188; control group: M = 226,
SD= 230; frequent-truth group: M = 189, SD= 102), but a clear
linear effect in the test phase, F(1, 39)= 8.28, p< 0.005, ƒ= 0.46.
Figure 2A illustrates that in the test phase, the lie-effect in the test
phase gradually increased from the frequent-lie group (M = 24,
SD= 296) over the control group (M = 131, SD= 156) to the
frequent-truth group (M = 269, SD= 199).
Errors
Neither of the main effects reached significance, both Fs< 1,
but the interaction between Experiment Phase and the linear
effect of Group was significant, F(1, 39)= 6.27, p< 0.05 (see
Figure 2B). A one-way ANOVA on the lie-effect scores revealed
no linear effect of Group in the baseline phase, F(1, 39)= 2.88,
p= 0.10 (frequent-lie group: M = 4.17, SD= 4.84; control group:
M = 4.36, SD= 4.84; frequent-truth group:M = 0.00, SD= 8.92).
In contrast, the main effect of Group showed a significant linear
course in the test phase, F(1, 39)= 4.11, p< 0.05, ƒ= 0.33. As
can be seen in Figure 2B, the lie-effect again gradually increased
from the frequent-lie group (M =−0.59, SD= 4.89) to the con-
trol group (M = 1.19, SD= 6.86), and from the control group to
the frequent-truth group (M = 3.97, SD= 5.94).
DISCUSSION
In the present experiment, we investigated whether practice in
lying or telling the truth influences the cognitive cost of lying.
Like Verschuere et al. (2011b), we found that during the train-
ing phase, lying became more difficult for participants in the
frequent-truth group than for participants in the frequent-lie
group. As such, our present results are in conflict with the con-
clusions of Johnson et al. (2005) and Vendemia et al. (2005), who
both argued that the cognitive cost of lying is resistant against
practice. However, the experimental designs of both Johnson et
al. and Vendemia et al. may have been suboptimal to investi-
gate the effects of practice on the cognitive cost of lying. As
mentioned earlier, Johnson et al. randomly intermixed blocks of
truth-trials and blocks of lie-trials within participants, which may
FIGURE 1 | Lie-effect of response latencies (A) and errors (B) on test trials for the frequent-lie, control, and frequent-truth group, during the baseline
phase, the training phase and the test phase. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
FIGURE 2 | Lie-effect of response latencies (A) and errors (B) on filler trials for the frequent-lie, control, and frequent-truth group, during the baseline
phase and the test phase. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
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have prevented consistent changes in their participants’ abilities
to lie. Likewise, participants in the experiment of Vendemia et
al. were manipulated to lie on only 50% of the trials, mimicking
the design that we used for our control group. It could therefore
be argued that participants in the study of Vendemia et al. were
not consistently trained to respond either truthfully or decep-
tively, making consistent changes in their cognitive ability to lie
less likely.
Furthermore, we found that practice can have some enduring
effects on the cognitive cost of lying in the test phase (see also Hu
et al., 2012). During the test phase, lying was easier for participants
in the frequent-lie group and lying was more difficult for partic-
ipants in the frequent-truth group. However, these effects were
limited to the data of the filler questions (i.e., the specific ques-
tions which were used for the training manipulation). The finding
that the training effect did not carry over to the test questions
(i.e., the questions which required 50% truthful and 50% decep-
tive responses throughout the entire experiment) indicates that
our training manipulation was not sufficient to genuinely alter the
dominance of the truth response. Although unexpected, it is not
uncommon to find that cognitive training manipulations do not
generalize to non-trained stimuli (e.g., Schoenmakers et al., 2007).
Further research is needed to investigate whether a more intensive
training (e.g., over several days) would have such an enduring
effect on new items. Nevertheless, our finding that changes in the
lie-effect on the filler trials persisted over time further challenges
the assumption that “. . . even after thousands of trials of practice,
it is unlikely that the increased difficulty associated with making
deceptive responses will be erased entirely” (Johnson et al., 2005,
p. 402).
An interesting remaining issue concerns the mechanism under-
lying the changes in the lie-effect on test trials during the training
phase. As this change did not persist in the test phase, the effects
may be caused by specific properties of the task or the design.
In our opinion, there are at least three – not necessarily mutu-
ally exclusive – possible explanations. A first explanation stems
from research on task switching (e.g., see Monsell, 2003; Kiesel
et al., 2010; Vandierendonck et al., 2010). In a typical task switch-
ing design, participants are on each trial required to perform one
out of two different tasks. Participants are generally faster and
more accurate on trials that are preceded by a trial in which the
same task was performed compared to trials that are preceded by
a trial in which the other task was performed. The drop in perfor-
mance on trials that require a task switch is known as the switch
cost. Our present experiment bears some resemblance with such
dual task paradigms in the sense that our participants were also
required to perform one out of two possible tasks, namely lying or
telling the truth. Crucially, during the training phase, the switch-
ing between lying and telling the truth differed between the three
groups. In the frequent-truth group, the overall larger proportion
of truth-trials increased the probability that truth-trials involved
repetitions and that lie-trials involved a switch (e.g., Truth-Truth-
Truth-Lie-Truth). In a similar fashion, in the frequent-lie group,
truth-trials were more likely to involve switches and lie-trials were
more likely to involve repetitions (e.g., Lie-Lie-Truth-Lie-Lie).
Thus, task switch costs may have increased the lie-effect in the
frequent-truth group, and reduced it in the frequent-lie group. A
second possible mechanism behind the group differences on the
test trials during the training phase is the oddball-effect (e.g., see
Squires et al., 1975; Stevens et al., 2000; Goldstein et al., 2002).
In a typical oddball task, participants are required to respond dif-
ferently to two types of stimuli. Crucially, one of the stimuli is
highly frequent, and the other is less frequent. Participants are
typically fast to respond to the frequent stimuli, but slower to
respond to the less frequent stimuli. In the present study, partic-
ipants in the frequent-lie group encountered many lie-trials, and
truth-trials were relatively rare. As a result, these participants were
more likely to respond fast on lie-trials and slow on truth-trials,
resulting in a decreased lie-effect. Inversely, in the frequent-truth
group, the truth-trials were highly frequent and the lie-trials were
relatively rare, resulting in fast responses on truth-trials and slower
responses on lie-trials, and thus leading to a stronger lie-effect. A
third possible explanation for the group differences during the
training phase is goal neglect (e.g., see De Jong et al., 1999; Kane
and Engle, 2003; Debey et al., 2012). According to the goal neglect
theory (Duncan, 1995), the selection of an appropriate response is
guided by task goals. The more active such a task goal is, the more
accurate and fast a response will be, while responses will be slower
and less accurate if they are guided by a more neglected task goal.
It is possible that our manipulation of the proportions of lie and
truth-trials resulted in our three groups having different dominant
task goals. As a result, in the frequent-lie group, the most active
task goal may have been to respond deceptively and inhibit truth-
ful responses, resulting in fast and accurate responses on lie-trials
and slower and less accurate responses on truth-trials, resulting in
a smaller lie-effect. Inversely, if the main task goal in the frequent-
truth group was to respond truthfully and avoid lying, this would
result in fast and accurate responses on truth-trials, and slower
and less accurate responses on lie-trials, hence resulting in a larger
lie-effect.
In future research, it may be possible to differentiate between
these different mechanisms. For instance, presenting lie- and
truth-trials in a predictable order should reduce the impact of a
switch cost or oddball-effect, while such a manipulation is unlikely
to influence the effect of goal neglect. Another possibility is to
manipulate the duration of the response-stimulus interval (RSI).
While longer RSIs provide more preparation time and should
hence decrease switch costs (Monsell, 2003), longer RSIs have also
been shown to hamper goal maintenance and induce goal neglect
(De Jong et al., 1999; Debey et al., 2012). Thus, if the difference in
the lie-effects during the training phase is driven by a switch cost,
then an increased RSI should reduce this difference. Alternatively,
if the difference is driven by goal neglect, then an increased RSI
should further inflate the effect.
The results of our study may also have implications for
the detection of deception in forensic settings (Granhag and
Strömwall, 2004; Verschuere et al., 2011a). Given the fact that
lying becomes more difficult while people often tell the truth,
the accuracy of lie detection tests may be improved by adding
a large number of verifiable questions to the interrogation. Our
results suggest that if suspects are obliged to respond truthfully on
these verifiable questions, they may experience greater difficulty
when lying on a crucial incriminating question. Our results of the
filler trials suggest that the cognitive cost of lying can be reduced
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for specific well-trained lies. Translated to the forensic context,
this may mean that a guilty suspect who has repeated the same
lies over and over again (e.g., to the police, to lawyers, to judge,
etc.) may experience less cognitive load when lying. Our results
suggest that, with repeated lying, deceptive responses may cogni-
tively mirror truth telling, thus hampering lie detection. However,
more research is needed to investigate these forensic implications
in detail. For instance, it is uncertain whether our results would
be replicated in a context where participants have something to
gain or lose or where arousal and emotional distress are high, or
whether certain strategies or counter-measures can influence our
pattern of results.
Our study also has a number of limitations. First, our sample
consisted only of 42 participants, resulting in 14 participants per
group. As a result, our experiment may have lacked the statistical
power that is needed to uncover smaller effects. A second limita-
tion is more inherent to our specific methodology, namely our use
of autobiographical questions as stimuli in the Sheffield lie test.
As mentioned earlier, these specific questions were not emotion-
ally salient, nor were they related to crime. As such, the possible
forensic implications of our present results need to be addressed
in an ecologically more valid context, for instance by using ques-
tions related to a mock crime that participants have or have not
committed. Also, although the autobiographical questions that
we used were related to actions that participants had or had not
performed on the day of testing, some participants may have been
uncertain of their initial answers as well as their responses during
the subsequent Sheffield lie test. Such uncertainty may have arisen
especially on questions concerning habitual behaviors (e.g., buy-
ing a newspaper), or on actions that were performed on the day
before testing. In our follow-up research, we now ask participants
to perform specific actions in the laboratory, prior to testing (e.g.,
see Debey et al., 2012). This new methodology has advantages
over the methodology that we used in the present experiment, as
it allows us to control the yes/no ratio of answers and it reduces
possible uncertainty with the participants.
In sum, the data of our present experiment suggest that lying
becomes cognitively less demanding while participants are often
lying, and that lying becomes cognitively more difficult while par-
ticipants are often telling the truth. Furthermore, these effects were
not due to baseline differences between the three groups, and prac-
tice on specific lies had enduring effects over time, suggesting that
the detection of well-trained lies may prove to be a thorny issue.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Kristina Suchotzki is supported by an ECRP Grant (09-ECRP-025;
FWO Grant ESF 3G099310). Evelyne Debey is a fellow of the Spe-
cial Research Fund (Aspirant BOF UGent) at Ghent University.
Adriaan Spruyt is Postdoctoral Fellow of the Flemish Research
Foundation (FWO – Vlaanderen).
REFERENCES
Christ, S. E., van Essen, D. C., Wat-
son, J. M., Brubaker, L. E., and
McDermott, K. B. (2009). The con-
tributions of prefrontal cortex and
executive control to deception: evi-
dence from activation likelihood
estimate meta-analysis. Cereb. Cor-
tex 19, 1557–1566.
Cohen, J. (1992). A power primer. Psy-
chol. Bull. 112, 155–159.
De Jong, R. D., Berendsen, E., and
Cools, R. (1999). Goal neglect and
inhibitory limitations: dissociable
causes of interference effects in con-
flict situations. Acta Psychol. (Amst.)
101, 379–394.
Debey, E., Verschuere, B., and Crombez,
G. (2012). Lying and executive
control: an experimental investiga-
tion using ego depletion and goal
neglect. Acta Psychol. (Amst.) 140,
133–141.
Dike, C. C., Baranoski, M., and Griffith,
E. E. H. (2005). Pathological lying
revisited. J. Am.Acad. Psychiatry Law
33, 342–349.
Duncan, J. (1995). “Attention, intelli-
gence, and the frontal lobes,” in The
Cognitive Neurosciences, ed. M. S.
Gazzaniga (Cambridge: MIT Press),
721–733.
Furedy, J. J., Davis, C., and Gurevich,
M. (1988). Differentiation of decep-
tion as a psychological process – A
psychophysiological approach. Psy-
chophysiology 25, 683–688.
Gamer, M. (2011). “Detection of decep-
tion and concealed information
using neuroimaging techniques,”
in Memory Detection: Theory and
Application of the Concealed Infor-
mation Test, eds B. Verschuere, G.
Ben-Shakhar, and E. Meijer (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press),
90–113.
Goldstein, A., Spencer, K. M., and
Donchin, E. (2002). The influence
of stimulus deviance and novelty
on the P300 and Novelty P3. Psy-
chophysiology 39, 781–790.
Granhag, P. A., and Strömwall, L. A.
(2004).The Detection of Deception in
Forensic Contexts. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., and
Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measur-
ing individual differences in implicit
cognition: the implicit association
test. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 74,
1464–1480.
Hu, X., Chen, H., and Fu, G.
(2012). A repeated lie becomes
a truth? The effect of inten-
tional control and training on
deception. Front. Psychol. 3:488.
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00488
Johnson, R., Barnhardt, J., and Zhu,
J. (2003). The deceptive response:
effects of response conflict and
strategic monitoring on the late
positive component and episodic
memory-related brain activity. Biol.
Psychol. 64, 217–253.
Johnson, R., Barnhardt, J., and Zhu, J.
(2005). Differential effects of prac-
tice on the executive processes used
for truthful and deceptive responses:
an event-related brain potential
study. Brain Res. Cogn. Brain Res. 24,
386–404.
Kane, M. J., and Engle, R. W. (2003).
Working memory capacity and the
control of attention: the contribu-
tions of goal neglect, response com-
petition, and task set to stroop inter-
ference. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 132,
47–70.
Kiesel, A., Steinhauser, M., Wendt, M.,
Falkenstein, M., Jost, K., Philipp, A.
M., et al. (2010). Control and inter-
ference in task switching: a review.
Psychol. Bull. 136, 849–874.
Monsell, S. (2003). Task switching.
Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 7,
134–140.
Polage, D. C. (2012). Fabrication infla-
tion increases as source monitor-
ing ability decreases. Acta Psychol.
(Amst.) 139, 335–342.
Sartori, G., Agosta, S., Zogmaister, C.,
Ferrara, S. D., and Castiello, U.
(2008). How to accurately detect
autobiographical events.Psychol. Sci.
19, 772–780.
Schoenmakers, T., Wiers, R. W., Jones,
B. T., Bruce, G., and Jansen,
A. T. M. (2007). Attentional re-
training decreases attentional bias in
heavy drinkers without generaliza-
tion. Addiction 102, 399–405.
Spence, S. A., Farrow, T. F., Herford, A.
E., Wikinson, I. D., Zheng, Y., and
Woodruff, P. W. R. (2001). Behav-
ioral and functional anatomical cor-
relates deception in humans. Neu-
roreport 12, 2849–2853.
Spence, S. A., Kaylor-Hughes, C. J.,
Brook, M. L., Lankappa, S. T., and
Wilkinson, I. D. (2008). “Mun-
chausen’s syndrome by proxy” or
a “miscarriage of justice?” An ini-
tial application of functional neu-
roimaging to the question of guilt
versus innocence. Eur. Psychiatry 23,
309–314.
Squires, N. K., Squires, K. C., and
Hillyard, S. A. (1975). Two vari-
eties of long-latency positive waves
evoked by unpredictable audi-
tory stimuli in man. Electroen-
cephalogr. Clin. Neurophysiol. 38,
387–401.
Stevens, A. A., Skudlarski, P., Gatenby,
J. C., and Gore, J. C. (2000). Event-
related fMRI of auditory and visual
oddball tasks. Magn. Reson. Imaging
18, 495–502.
Vandierendonck, A., Liefooghe, B.,
and Verbruggen, F. (2010). Task
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science November 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 526 | 6
Van Bockstaele et al. Learning to lie
switching: interplay of reconfigura-
tion and interference control. Psy-
chol. Bull. 136, 601–626.
Vendemia, J. M. C., Buzan, R. F.,
and Green, E. P. (2005). Practice
effects, workload, and reaction time
in deception. Am. J. Psychol. 5,
413–429.
Verschuere, B., Ben-Shakhar, G., and
Meijer, E. (2011a). Memory Detec-
tion: Theory and Application of
the Concealed Information Test.
Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Verschuere, B., Spruyt, A., Meijer, E. H.,
and Otgaar, H. (2011b). The ease of
lying. Conscious. Cogn. 20, 908–911.
Vrij, A., Granhag, P. A., Mann, S., and
Leal, S. (2011). Outsmarting the
liars: toward a cognitive lie detection
approach. Psychol. Sci. 20, 28–32.
Vrij, A., Visser, R., Mann, S., and Leal,
S. (2006). Detecting deception by
manipulating cognitive load. Trends
Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 10, 141–142.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any com-
mercial or financial relationships that
could be construed as a potential con-
flict of interest.
Received: 24 July 2012; accepted: 06
November 2012; published online: 30
November 2012.
Citation: Van Bockstaele B, Verschuere
B, Moens T, Suchotzki K, Debey E
and Spruyt A (2012) Learning to lie:
effects of practice on the cognitive cost
of lying. Front. Psychology 3:526. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00526
This article was submitted to Frontiers in
Cognitive Science, a specialty of Frontiers
in Psychology.
Copyright © 2012 Van Bockstaele, Ver-
schuere, Moens, Suchotzki, Debey and
Spruyt . This is an open-access arti-
cle distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License,
which permits use, distribution and
reproduction in other forums, provided
the original authors and source are
credited and subject to any copyright
notices concerning any third-party graph-
ics etc.
www.frontiersin.org November 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 526 | 7
Van Bockstaele et al. Learning to lie
APPENDIX
Table A1 | List of the two lists of autobiographical questions that were
used as either filler or test items (counterbalanced) in the experiment.
List 1 List 2
Did you go for a run? Did you stop at a traffic light?
Did you go down a staircase? Did you go to a supermarket?
Did you go up a staircase? Did you buy some flowers?
Did you buy petrol? Did you do the dishes?
Did you eat chocolate? Did you take an elevator?
Did you take a bus? Did you clean a window?
Did you take a train? Did you reschedule an appointment?
Did you open a dustbin? Did you read a book?
Did you take a bath? Did you park a moped?
Did you make a sandwich? Did you squeeze a lemon?
Did you post a letter? Did you send an e-mail?
Did you close a door? Did you stroke a pet?
Did you take a shower? Did you wear a coat?
Did you buy a newspaper? Did you open a fridge?
Did you buy a magazine? Did you switch on a computer?
Did you use a knife? Did you smoke a cigarette?
Did you use an umbrella? Did you look at a watch?
Did you take a pill? Did you open a water tap?
Did you speak to a police officer? Did you lift a toilet seat?
Did you eat a grapefruit? Did you use a pedestrian crossing?
Did you break a window? Did you use an ATM?
Did you use a telephone? Did you change money?
Did you receive a telegram? Did you vacuum a carpet?
Did you drink fruit juice? Did you drink cough syrup?
Did you listen to the radio? Did you greet someone?
Did you use the internet? Did you clean the house?
Did you stand in a queue? Did you check your PO box?
Did you sit in a waiting room? Did you brush your teeth?
Did you make your bed? Did you listen to an MP3?
Did you wash your hands? Did you sit on a bicycle?
Did you sign a document? Did you stand on a ladder?
Did you drink coffee? Did you sit on a chair?
Did you speak to a child? Did you rip a piece of paper?
Did you watch television? Did you water the plants?
Did you eat onions? Did you use your keys?
Did you drink water? Did you boil some water?
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